The Australian Farmer

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the australian farmer

early 1990s, when DPI bred, midge resistant lines became adapted enough for commercial use, that private companies could release competitive re- sistant hybrids. Once these hybrids reached the market, susceptible varieties quickly became un- sellable, forcing widespread private investment in resistance breeding by the seed companies. By the early 2000s, highly resistant, well adapted hy- brids dominated Australian sorghum production. The impact on farming systems was profound. Eliminating the need to spray for midge preserved natural enemies of heliothis, allowing grow- ers to control that major pest using viruses and biological control instead of broad spectrum in- secticides. This reduced costs, slowed resistance development in heliothis, and delivered flow on benefits to sorghum and cotton industries alike. Perhaps more, midge resistance gave growers back planting flexibility, allowing sorghum to be planted when seasonal conditions were right, rather than around pest risk, unlocking major yield gains and fundamentally changing the prof- itability and reliability of sorghum production in Australia. Despite the pest being significant in other areas of the world, Australia is the only major sorghum growing region where midge re- sistance cultivars are widespread. The substantial benefits of the trait took approximately 40 years to deliver, and the benefits dramatically exceeded what was envisaged when the research began. Midge resistance is one example of a pre-breeding success story, but similar public research pipelines underpin all of our broad acre crops and have been pivotal in the development of traits like black leg resistance in canola, and long coleoptile varieties that improve establish- ment in wheat. Risks to the current system of trait development Australia’s agricultural innovation system faces growing risks from long term underinvestment and structural change. Investment in agricultural research as a share of agricultural GDP peaked at around 5 per cent in the late 1970s and has since de- clined to approximately 3 per cent placing Australia

The reasons for this split are straightforward. Seed companies respond more quickly to mar- ket forces and are usually better able to deliver products cost effectively than public sector or- ganisations, but they typically do not have the broad-based science capacity and skilled special- ists required for pre-breeding and trait discovery that are available in the public sector. In addition, the economics of pre-breeding are unattractive for commercial companies. Pre-breeding innov- ations take a long time to return a profit, have a high risk of failure, and may be hard for any one company to capture value through increased profitability. Public sector organisations often have a longer horizon and are interested in pub- lic good rather than monetisation of innovation. Sorghum midge resistance an example stra- tegic pre-breeding For decades, the sorghum midge was one of the most damaging pests facing Australian sorghum growers. The midge lays its eggs in flowering sorghum heads, and the larvae replace the de- veloping grain, leading to serious yield loss and, in susceptible hybrids, complete crop failure. Because midge populations build rapidly on flowering crops, growers were forced to plant early and in tight planting windows alongside neighbours to escape peak infestations, often spraying insecticides to protect flowering heads. This approach was costly, risky, and heavily de- pendent on timing and weather. A turning point came after host plant resist- ance to sorghum midge was first identified in the United States in 1973. After this discovery, the Queensland’s Department of Primary Industries (DPI) began pre breeding work in 1975, but the early resistance sources were poorly adapted to Australian conditions, and the first resistant hy- brids could not compete agronomically and were not commercially successful. Because breeding for midge resistance was technically difficult and commercially risky, private seed companies did not invest, leaving the public sector to carry the work for more than a decade. It was not until the

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